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Socrates and Protagoras
I
Analyses of Protagoras* so-called ’Great Speech* are many,
~fz>r- file
<4>
farther most part addressed ie* the question how the speech
measures up to Socrates' probing earlier in the dialogue.
Scholars used to give a number of wrong answers to this question,
finding quite unnecessary fault with Protagoras* argument and
attributing to him several confusions of which he is innocent.
G.B. Kerferd, however, cleared the ground of this debris,* and
the time has arrived for examination of the Great Speech from
the other side, to see why Socrates raises at the end of the
Speech the particular group of questions Plato makes him raise,
and whether there is any connection between the Speech and
Socrates* subsequent arguments.
Some have suggested that Socrates’ single quarrel with
Protagoras is that the Sophist gives no clear account of the
nature of goodness.
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It is then suggested that in the end it

is the inability to say what goodness is which causes Protagoras’
downfall.

That there is much truth in the second part of this

view the final paragraphs of the dialogue show.
half of it is insufficiently precise.

But the first

As M„J, Gagarin has seen,

if Socrates saw in the Speech unelarity purely on the question
of what is Virtue, he was sufficiently trained and fearless in
dialectic toask at once that simple but far-reaching question.
If he asks more specific questions., as he does, it is natural
to suppose that he has specific reasons for asking them.

Gagarin

and I,. Verr-'enyx have rightly urged, in effect, that. Socrates is
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worried by the way in which terms like 'justice1, 'moderation'}
and 'virtue* are bandied about in Protagoras' remarks without
any clear statement of what they mean and how they are related.^
If, in fact, Socrates asks what the relationship is between
Virtue and the various virtues then it is reasonable at least
to ask whether there are not in Protagoras' preceding Speech
some elements of unclarity, confusion and/or contradiction on
this particular point.

Socrates quotes, after all, from

Protagoras' own words, from both myth and explanation, in pos
ing his questions.
be.

But even this is not so exact as it might

Since, therefore, it is the main contention of this paper

that the succeeding argument is bound up very closely with the
language used by Protagoras in the Great Speech, and with the
structure of some of his arguments, it is well to start with
the relatively uncontroversial example of the relationship be
tween Protagoras on the virtues and Socrates* subsequent ques
tions; and having here shown that Socrates' thinking is firmly
based on what Protagoras has actually said and implied, only
then to go on to the more disputable arguments which Socrates
develops.

We may then discover what basis for these also exists

in the Great Speech.

It will be easiest to consider the virtues

in order.
We may start with "piety" or "holiness".

Protagoras does

not name this virtue at 322A, but nevertheless his words are
such as to bring it to the mind of any listener (or reader, for
that matter) interested in the virtues.

Early man believed in
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and worshipped the gods, and set about constructing temples and
statues of them*

But this is before the arrival of political
* c l/¿ v

virtue on the scene (witness 321B
political wisdom he had not, and 322B
ocimo £tX^v

no\<

they had not yet the political art) „

Jr*

~ίχ^ν

If piety thus

precedes ’’political virtue," what does Protagoras mean by in
cluding impiety among the list of opposites of the virtues at
323E-324A, and more positively by including holiness in a list
of virtues at 324E-325A?

How, in turn, is this to be squared

with the suggestion at 323A that every piece of political ad
vice (or all political virtueJ ) must ’’proceed by way of” jus
tice and moderation?

If piety is part of virtue, such that to

do & pious action is to do a virtuous one but the converse is
not true, and justice and moderation are similar parts of Virtue,
then (obviously) to do either & just action or a moderate one
is to do a virtuous act loir.

To conjoin justice and moderation

as at 323E, in stating that all political advice (or virtue)
must fee just and moderate, may give rise to certain suspicions
in the mind of an attentive listener such as Socrates,

The

omission of piety here, simultaneously with the coupling of
justice and moderation, might suggest either that piety here
is no longer a part of political virtue in the required sense
(a suggestion at least fully consonant with 322A in its context) ,
or that one of the following set of alternatives is true.

(1)

Piety is to be equated with either justice or moderation, in
the sense that to do a pious action is to do a just action or
to do & moderate one, depending on one’s choice of equation,
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and to do a just (or moderate) action is to do a pious one;
(2) Piety is to be included in either justice or moderation,

apious action is to do a

in the sense that to do

moderate) one, but to do a just (or moderate) one is not neces»
s&rily to do a pious one; (3) Piety, justice, and moderation
are merely different names for the same thing, which is also
called virtue, and to do an action characterizable by any one
of them is by definition to do one characterizable by all of
them; (4) The omission of piety is to be explained by the
thought that if one possesses either justice or moderation or
both one must as a matter of fact possess also the virtue of
piety:

that piety is in fact (though not in definition) in

separable from either or both of the other virtues mentioned*
The resemblance between this set of choices and Socrates'
subsequent questioning is fairly close»

(3) and (4) turn up

pretty explicitly at 329C^and 3291 respectively, and (1) and
(2) could well be regarded as subsidiary

variants on (3), to

be investigated only if neither (3) nor (4) turns out. to be the
whole truth*

This state of affairs is hardly fortuitous*

Nor

is this passage alone in omitting piety from the list of vir
tues:

in the myth again moderation and justice are mentioned

together without piety*

When Socrates cites Protagoras’ own

words at 329C he duly cites not only this latter coupling with
out piety, bat also a list including piety*

Such lists are

found at 323E (where the vices include impiety) and 324E-325A
(where '’being pious” is coordinate with justice and moderation)·..
In short, if we take some of Protagoras' lists of virtues at
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face value, we are presented with a set of coordinate parts of
Virtue including piety with justice and moderation; but his
omissions of piety are unfortunate for that point of view.
Socrates, we may note in passing, has chosen not only his ques
tions but also his citations with care.
This is already no trifling matter, for all that Socrates
ironically labels it as such at 323E.

It raises, for example,

the whole question discussed in the Euthyphro^ whether goodness
and piety are coextensive and if so which is logically prior.
But there is more to come.

Protagoras has more obscurities to

offer on the next problem, that of the relationship between
justice and moderation (whether expressed by Sok+ioirovj
<rw<?fo<jvv>7

or by.eo&os

and
So «η).

and

At 322B, in d

destruction of the earliest human communities, he says “They
were unjust to each other, not having the political art, so
that they scattered once again and were killed.”

Is mutual

injustice here the only consequence, or merely part of the
total consequence of the lack of the political art?
the whole or merely part of the political art?
told.

Is justice

We are not yet

Is lack of moderation among the reasons for men’s in

ability to fora cities, or not?

Nothing in this passage makes

it necessary to assume either answer to the exclusion of the
other; but it should be observed that if injustice is the only
consequence of lacking political art, then either justice is
the same thing (under another name) as moderation or the qual
ity of moderation is superfluous to the political art and t o
man’s survival.

Anyway, Hermes is immediately sent to bring
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to mea moderet ion and justice-, And here again Protagoras fails
to specify, or otherwise indicate, whether moderation is a dis
tinct quality to be added to the justice whose necessity is al
ready apparent or whether 'moderation* and 'justice* are virtual
synonyms used together for rhetorical emphasis.

The word 'and'

can of course be used in Greek as in English to express either
the genuine addition of things or the rhetorical, conjunction of
terms.

What is more, the further question arises, and is left

unanswered, whether the functions of ordering the cities and
cementing friendships belong to moderation and justice severally
and respectively, or whether the two functions belong equally
to both virtues.

So far Protagoras* words offer no certain

answer to the questions Socrates is later to raise.

Nor, in

my opinion, is an answer to be seen in the pronoun used by
Zeus in Protagoras' story, when he refers to moderation and
justice as 'them'.

Once the separate arts have been brought

into the tale one might expect the virtues of justice and
moderation to be separate too.

But Protagoras is speaking in

rhetorical style, and this pronoun is little enough to go on,,
The rest of the myth

does nothing to clarify our problem.

It

contains nothing to reveal what, if moderation, and justice are
qualities operative in inter-personal behavior, is the relation
between these qualities.

Protagoras does not say clearly what

different kinds of action result from the different qualities,
if they are different, and he offers no other clear differenti
ation of them.
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Similar difficulties beset the analyst of Protagoras* ex
position of his myth.

At 323A a sentence we have already looked

at speaks of proceeding by way of justice and moderation, with
an "and” as unclear as the one already discussed in the myth.
The singulars ’’political virtue" and the like help not at all
to decide whether this unity is that of a face or a large slab
of gold.

But 323A does yield something more definite with the

words "justice and the rest of political virtue," or
k-.il T y s

ΤΓο\/ΤίΚη5.

(The rendering ’justice

and political virtue besides' is ruled out by the consideration
that, in view of what the sophist has already said, it would
be^bsurd for him to distinguish justice from the political
art as two entirely separate things.)
established as a part of Virtue.

Justice is at last

The phrase "justice and the

rest of political Virtue" at 323B reinforces this point.

In

addition Protagoras begins to distinguish in use between mod
eration and justice when he says that if a man admits (truly)
to not possessing justice he is accused of lacking moderation;
but this is only a beginning, and is decidedly not & clear
statement of & defined distinction.

The lists of qualities,

already discussed, at 323E and 324E also appear to separate,
in the first case injustice and impiety, and in the second
justice, moderation, and holiness.

The second mattes its trio

of qualities by implication info parts of virtue, admittedly
without making clear exactly what sort of part.
Thus Protagoras creates a 'more or less clear impression
ixt his listener's mind.

But his line of argument between the

8

two lists is such as to destroy one*s confidence again»* Socra™
tes is invited at 324A to believe that the practice of punish*
ing the tm.just demonstrates the punishers* belief in the possi*
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bility of acquiring Virtue»

The a ira of punishment is deter*

rence from injustice and this aim shows the teachability of
Virtue»

It is not merely that this section exhibits a rapid

interchange between ’Virtue* and words formed on the root *dik~
signifying (for the purposes of ethical discourse in Classical
Attis Greek) ’just*»

The point is that the whole argument, as

it stands, depends for its validity on the assimilation or the
indissoluble connection of justice to moderation, and indeed
to Virtue»

For if justice and moderation were distinct quali

ties, separate parts of the over*all quality of Virtue, then a
man who has only one of them need not have the whole of Virtue
» unless it is impossible to possess one of these distinct
parts without the other(s)4

It follows from this that when

Protagoras says that the purpose of teaching justice (or
deterring from injustice) indicates belief in the teachability
of Virtue he is assuming Athenian belief either in the identity
of justice and Virtue, or the inevitable accompaniment of
9
justice by moderation»
whether such inevitability is the
result of absolute similarity or of some other indissoluble
connection is not here important»

If Virtue and justice are

neither identical nor indissolubly connected, the teachability
of justice will not necessarily be the teachability of Virtue
as a whole, and Protagoras8 argument will formally fail»

The

failure could be rectified by stating that justice is only a.»
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»
example, and/or that punishment is equally a deterrent from
other vices»

But as the argument stands, it fails»

Does Plato treat the failure as merely formal?

Hardly?

for when Socrates asks his questions at the conclusion of the
Sophist®s expositiong the first includes the query whether the
word *justice* denotes a part of Virtue or the whole, the second
is whether the parts of Virtue (since Protagoras opts for parts)
are all alike, like the parts of a slab of gold, and the third
is (granted a difference between the parts) whether they are
all so bound together that one may not be had without the
others»

The resemblance between the choices open to Protagoras

after the argument of 324A-C and the choices offered him by
Socrates at 3 2 9 0 2S is striking, far too striking to be put
down to coincidence»

It shows us Socrates framing his ques°

tions with eyes glued both to Protagoras8 use of words and to
the detailed structure of the Sopbist-s argument.
There is nothing more that is relevant to the present
issue till 3250,

In the meantime the great man tells his

audience that people do believe Virtue teachable, and in that
belief set about teaching it, from cradle to grave.

They set

about educating the- younger generation irá Virtue as a whole
(simply "to ensure that the child will turn out best," 325D),
Parents tell their children, "This is just, that unjust, and
this is seemly, that is unseemly, and this la holy, that is
unholy and do these but do not do those, *■ The relations be
tween what is just, what is seemly and what is holy are not
articulated; the terms concerned could, but need not, be merely

different words fot the same thing.

Teachers » on taking over

from parents, pay less Attention to their subject then to
twoojjf* » orderliness; the literary side of education is de~
signed to give by precept and example (just like the parents
at 325D) instruction in what to doe

The musical teaching, and

this is an important sentence, the musical teaching of the
citharist inculcates moderation and the avoidance of any wrong™
doing in the young0
literally;

vstranslate the last p

Let

"they care for moderation and that the young may
y-

do no evil,"

?

ovvvqsT l£
rr<p£

i

^

*

c

'

<

\cukju οη-^s «v oc
f

.

f. 7

'>tvKot Kovç^ùJaxv ,

Once again we are pusssled by the word ***-c ;

in this context it could signify either #i.e0* or ’and* 0

The

whole phrasç raises at least three possibilities which are of
interest to us.

The first is that moderation here is the whole

of Virtue, and is here equated with it,,
here be equivalent to making all
neutral)*

Doing nothing bad would

actione good, (or at worse

The second is that moderation is here a part of

Virtue, and is, as often in Greek thought, the negative part
involved in refraining from evil,.

In this case, if one posses™

ses to perfection all the positive virtues, almost if not quite
all one’s -actions will be (I suppose) virtuous, or at worst
neutral, and one will (I suppose) do no wrong or at least
generally avoid wrongdoing»

In so far as moderation is nega<*

tive this would bring ue to the position that it was a concep
tually distinct part of Virtue, 'but that one could not have the
other virtues without possessing this one.

Here also we-find

two possibilities that look very like two alternatives later

il

laid by Socrates before Protagoras,
a highly unlikely one:

The third alternative is

it is that moderation is here added to

the avoidance of evil and distinguished from It,

So strong a

distinction between moderation and "doing nothing evil" would
run clean counter to a deep current in Classical Greek thought,^®
One may retain a suspicion that the motive for Protagoras’ men
tioning both moderation and the avoidance of wrongdoing was, in
the fictional context, either to explain the complex term
’moderation8 and delimit its meaning in this context, or merely
(once again) to add rhetorical emphasis,

But this time these

considerations have less bearing than earlier on the conclu
sions the sharp critic would be justified in drawing from his
words.

The crucial thing is that Socrates* group of questions

fits the ambiguities of this passage also.
One wants to ask further what the connection is between
the avoidance of wrongdoing, moderation and the. things the
young were told by their parents on the one hand to do, on the
other hand not to do.

If moderation and avoidance of wrongdoing

are the same, then the connection is obviously of^fche closest.
And the avoidance of injustice will then be part or whole of
moderation.

What the relation is for Protagoras and his critic

between justice and the avoidance of injustice is a question
to fee deferred a little.
There is more still to perturb the seeker after Protagoras*
meaning.

When the teachers of music and gymnastic have played

their part, the city steps in, compelling citiaens to live by
t h e laws.

It thus guides the conduct of life, teaching how to
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rule and be ruled*

There is no suggestion that this includes

only part of Virtue* or that it excludes any part of Virtue*
Indeed* it is regarded at 326E as evidence of a concern for
Virtue, quite simply*
ledge of Virtue*

No man must be altogether without know

If flute-playing were essential to cities

(sc* as Virtue or the political art is) people would be as un
grudging with instruction in it as now in things just and
lawful*

This new pairing of terns is not so important as what

follows*

But "just” and ’’lawful** must be related somehow;

either they are coextensive, or they are entirely distinct or
one is included in the other*

On the face of it the relation

of inclusion is less likely, less common in rhetorical Greek*
Then in the next sentence we have, more significantly, the re
placement of "things just and lawful" by "justice and Virtue",
for which is substituted in turn "things just and things law
ful*"

Again it is most likely that justice is either equiva

lent to Virtue or wholly distinct from it*
equivalence is perhaps the most reasonable*

The hypothesis of
Socrates is fully

justified by this passage alone in inquiring whether Protagoras
believes in

fcbaany that justice etc* are parts of Virtue

&.ttr

or/are'somehow equivalente

A similar type of ambiguity recurs

at 327C-D, where men educated by the laws are just, and are
compelled to take an interest in Virtue*
In short there are signs that not only in the case of
piety but also in those of moderation and justice Protagoras
has not made up his mind, and is therefore unclear, on exactly
the points which Socrates (after some thought, 32$) decides to
raise with him*

13

The question of w isdom and political art in the Speech of
Protagoras is of more evident importance for the rest of the
dialogue, and the tension between wisdom as a part of Virtue
and an art as the whole of the citizen*s Virtue has received
its share of scholarly commento**

A point already raised by

GoMoAo Grube needs integrating into the present context»
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In the myth proper, at 321C-D, Prometheus is related to have

Την ^vrc^ov cro^c^veruvTfvçC the wisdom involved in

stolen

the arts, together with fire, and given it to Man» There
V
*
^
\ *
follows a sentence of great interest,
Oov
Τον

βιον<r©#uv

ToiUTfl

%σ%ενΤΓοΚ^τοκγν ύοκ,

’'the wisdom concerned with livelihood man thus possessed, but
the political one (or the political [art]) he did not possess»”
The symmetry of this sentence would have us supply *wisdom* or
the place-filler ’one* where the Greek has only "the political"
In the feminine accusative to agree with the feminine noun for
’wisdom*»

This would pretty clearly suggest the equivalence of

political Virtue with wisdom - or rather a particular kind of
wisdom»

But the ellipse of the feminine ’art* with certain

adjectives structured like ’political* is familiar enough in
Greek, and Protagoras * audience might take him simply to mean
’the political art*, as opposed to the wisdom concerned with
technical skills and winning a livelihood»

It deserves mention

that this ic itself would justify Socrates iri inquiring at 3291
whether Protagoras believes wisdom also to be a part of Virtue
different from each of the others, even though it appears in
none of the lists of the virtues in the Great Speech itself»
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Plato’s reader, like Protagoras’ hearer, would like to know
precisely how wisdom stands,,

Furthermore, whether the struc

ture of this sentence is Platonic or Protagorean, it so hap
pens that Protagoras, though permitting the reader to suppose
his belief in a political wisdom synonymous with Virtue, newer
actually utters the words ’political wisdom* „

Therefore, when

Socrates asks him if he thinks wisdom a part of Virtue, Socrates
is not going flatly against the sophist’s expressed views, and
Protagoras does not have ringing in his ears his own denial*
The question is sensible, and the answer not self-evidently
foolish.
The position is equally tricky at 324D,

Protagoras men-

fcione the problem raised by Socrates about good men;

the prob

lem is why good men teach, their own sons in other subjects fit
for teaching, and make them "wise" in those skills, but make
them no better than anyone else in that virtue at which they
themselves are good.

Here again Protagoras does not openly

give voice to an expression of the give-away type of ’wise at
Virtue*,, but nevertheless the difficulty, which he is here
sharpening in order to refute it, is much sharper if being good
at the Virtue of good men is regarded as precisely parallel to
being wise at other skills.

The casual (but not too casual)

reader would most naturally suppose that Protagoras thought
Virtue

akind of wisdom, even though he does not himself for

mally call it such.
justified.

The question Socrates asks is further
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Deferring the discussion of the relation of ‘wisdom* to
'art*, we pass to courage,
treatment.

«

This receives a unique

Protagoras does not mention it directly at all in

the Great Speech, in either myth or argument. Socrates* question at 329E, whether courage also is not a part of Virtue,
might seem to be merely a piece of opportunism in response to
the immediate stimulus of Protagoras' statement at 329 E that
men can be brave without being just.

But here also there are

utterances and omissions in the Great Speech which are relevaut.

At the outset, in Protagoras* description of the primi

tive state of Man (322B), Man is said to have had arts and
crafts sufficient for a livelihood. But they did not have "the
political art, of which a part is the art of war."

This is

important as being the only time in his Speech that the sophist
explicitly mentions a part or parts of Virtue or of the political art.

It is an essential handle for Socrates* dialectic

which Protagoras thus casually hands to him.
also interesting in other ways.

The passage is

What is the relation of the

art of war to courage?· No hint here, but later it becomes
moderately clear that Protagoras follows the instinctive belief
of most people in deeming courage an essential condition of
skill in war.

This emerges at 326B-C.

The sophist, recounting

the gymnast's share in education, announces that bodily train
ing has the purpose of enabling the body to serve a sound in
tellect, and of avoiding the necessity, supposedly consequent
on physical weakness, of being let down by cowardice "in war
and other a v o c a t i o n s ¿V

sK«ù ¿V 7-us

ir&fecn v.
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»

This makes courage» though not exclusive to war,

belong in part to the conditions appropriate to success in it.
To show cowardice in war is evidently deemed bad by Protagoras
as by virtually every other Greek.

Courage (or at least the

absence of cowardice) is a part of what makes one good at war;
and so in Protagoras* sense of 'art* it is presumably part of
the art of war, which in turn is part of political Virtue.

The

weakest possible position on this is that Socrates is justified
once more by the tenor of the Great Speech, and not only by the
opportunity offered at 329E, in asking the speaker whether
courage also is not a part of Virtue in the required sense.
As for omissions, the most important is the neglect on
Plato's part —

or the avoidance on Protagoras' —

of the pro*

vision of any passage in which it is implied, even as a possible
inference, that courage is the whole of Virtue.

There is no

need to read any such implication into the phrase "both in war
and in other avocations" quoted above; "other" here may well be
meant allHLnclusively, but' *·γ;

or ‘avocations' does not

mean here ‘actions' but 'spheres of action® in a sense exempli
fied by war.

It would be a mistake to read into this any notion,

for example, of courage in the battle against one's baser self,
which would link courage with moderation,

Protagoras here has

in mind, as his reference to bodily weakness shows, physical
courage in the face of external dangers.

So courage alone of

the virtues has not, in the Great Speech or its immediate sequel,
any connection in Protagoras' mouth with the other virtues or
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with Virtue itself.

Nobody has the right to be surprised that

when, at 349D, Protagoras regroups his forces after the first
encounter with Socrates, the position he abandons is that the
other virtues are distinct from one another, the position on
which he takes his stand is one sharply distinguishing courage
from the rest.

Whether or not the Great Speech is Protagoraan

down to the kind of detail we have been discussing (a question
probably unanswerable), Plato is not constructing this dialogue
at random, but rather with the most careful attention to the
precise implications of Protagoras* initial grand pronouncement.
Socrates8 questioning serves to draw out and clarify those im
plications.
Protagoras* ambiguities and occasional implicit contradic
tion of himself thus amply justify and explain Socrates* choice
of questions to bring up when he stops speaking.

They might

even go far to explain why Socrates wishes to hear Protagoras
expatiate further (a desire expressed at 32SI). Are the vir«
*I
tues then parts of equivalents of Virtue? If distinct parts,
are they nevertheless as similar as the parts of a piece of
gold, so that to possess any one of them is to possess gold?
Or are they such that the possession of any one of them guaran
tees by & chain of implication the possession of each of the
others?

In answer Protagoras is unhesitating and unequivocal:

He separates the virtues from Virtue

fr o m e a c h other, and

apparently wishes to deny any mutual implication.

It is possi

ble to be courageous without being just, and again to be just

18

without being wise.

But Protagoras cannot, as we shall see,

se easily shake off his earlier remarks,.

They have already

excited Socrates* suspicions, and caused him to ask for clari
fication.

How much worse Protagoras* plight will become we

shall see in the sequel.

II
Frotagoras distinguishes the parts of Virtue from one
another in virtue of their having, like the part of the face,
different functions, and being also in other respects different.
One is not the same sort of thing as another.

Neither the

virtues themselves nor their functions are alike (330A-B).
Having elicited this, Socrates proceeds to examine the nature
of each.

After, somewhat unnecessarily, asking if he may in

troduce the term *justice* into the argument Socrates asks
whether justice is just or unjust.

Protagoras admits justice

to be just, and to be the sort of thing to be just.

I agree

with D. Savan that this is best taken to mean, in effect, that
justice has the function of producing (in some sense) just ac14
tions.
Similarly holiness is holy, and is evinced (in some
sense) in holy or pious actions.

Now Protagoras denied that

any one virtue was the same sort as the otherss

and Socrates

next inquires whether justice is therefore not the sort of
thing to be holy (i.o, to produce holy actions), and whether
holiness is not the sort of tiling to be just (i.e. to issue in
just actions).

The alternative which Socrates offers is that

1Q
o'

tat»tics is the sort of thing to be not-holy, and holiness the
sort of thing to be not-just; that justice issues in notions
not-holy and in fact unholy, ana holiness in actions not-just
and in fact unjust.

Socrates would himself prefer to say that

holiness issues i n just actions and justice in holy ones, and
that justice and holiness are either identical or extremely
alike, but Protagoras demurs, being willing to admit Socrates’
choice only for the sake of the argument, and being prepared
to deny any resemblance between holiness and justice of the
kind that Socrates wishes.

What he ¿oes not do is to point

out that not-just is different from unjust; that as many mod*»
eras have reminded us, contradictory is not synonymous with
15
contrary.
Scholars have spilled much ink on the question whether
the cormaission of this fallacy by Socrates (if it is a fallacy)
was intentional on Plato’s part or not.

There is indeed no

sjv Λΐδ s ¡art cut to an answrr, but it may be helpful to put the
«1 gum nr·, u.n its context, including the Great Speech of Protagoras
Centrar if-s and contradictories are slippery things, but it so
happens liat there is a surprisingly large number of inferences
from contradictory to contrary or parallels drawn between the©
in that Spea h.

Sorae of them ere perhaps more, easily justified

than others, hut the list below attempts completeness.
(1)

According t o Protagoras there was a stage when Haa

did n o t have tiw political art (3210); at 322B the mere absence
of the política'.» art (negative) means apparently that men coa·
mit injustice (contrary).

(2)

Those should be killed who arc
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«nuble to possess their share of justice an d moderation (322D)»
Simply because they lack, and are unable to acquire, these
qualities they are described as & "disease of the city"; it is
hard to think of them as other than actively unjust*

A compli

cated difficulty arises over the pair of analogies with fluteplaying*

At 323A Protagoras in drawing a distinction between

the other virtues and political Virtue contrasts (a) boasting
that one is good at flute-playing when he is not and (fe) saying
that o n e is unjust even when he is»

There is a rhetorical

parallel, here between the man not good at flute-playing and
cuwl
the unjust man, apparently a -parallel between contrary-''contra
dictory»

323B furnishes a further rhetorical parallel between

known unjust whose madness consists in confessing the truth and
the not-just man who madly does not claim to be just,

Protagoras

again encourages (though he does not formally compel) his
audience to equate the unjust with the non-just»

At first

^ sight the problem might seem to be solved at 327A-C, where
16
Sav&n
has rightly observed the suggestion of a possible tertitee
quid»

There we have an analogy between the good tm n and the

expert flautist, the total ignoramus of flute-playing and the
man who is so extreme that the most unjust man might seem just
in comparison with him»

The tertium quid between these is the

adequate flute-player, apparently the analogue of the normally
unjust man.

This analogy by itself can b e a&de t o work out if

we suppose that the one who plays the flute not-well at 327A Is
at least a flautist of a sort, only not an expert o n e ; and this
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is a plausible interpretation of the Greek expression

<Ao)\oo\rrt^·

pyj

But

fcke earlier passage there is no parci
/ >
ticiple to limit the sense of the negative phrase ην' p)
(3λ3β· ), and there the negative ought to cover both contrary
and neutral (or intermediate); and there the plain negative is
indeed parallel to the contrary - or what looks like a contrary.
If we let Protagoras off the hook in this second passage the
first swallowing of hook line and sinker becomes harder to
understand, and even more evidently mistaken —
and unjust are indeed contraries.

provided just

(4) Another suggestive sen

tence appears in Protagoras* argument about punishment.

At

324B rational punishment is supposed to be motivated by the
desire to ensure that the man punished does not again commit
injustice; t W

ρη ¿v ÔlS &

.

This intention Protagoras

regards as showing the punishers’ belief that Virtue is teach
able.

This implies that not to commit injustice Is a suffici

ent condition of Virtue (either directly or through the mutual
implication of the individual virtues).

This in turn implies

that non-injustice is justice, without there being any third
state which is neither justice nor injustice.

Otherwise there

is nothing to connect non-injustice with Protagorean Virtue.
Protagoras, to be sure, does a little to blur the point by in
serting the apologetic - sounding sentence "at least he punishes
for deterrence5 sake," ^WOT^piTrjs ÿ o » v

9

But the

apologetic tone of "at least" should not be taken too seriously.
This is, after all, the only proof Protagoras offers for the
proposition that the Athenians believe Virtue teachable.

He
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cannot tmderœine it too farc

He must believe, or at least

wish to convince others, that the argument is sound0

If the

avoidance of injustice is not either equivalent to or (in one
of the two ways Mentioned above) a sufficient condition of
Virtue, he lias not formally proved his point*

(5) At 325A, in

a conditional (but mot, in Protagoras” eyes, counterfactúa1)
sentence* the protases includes the suggestion that a man must
not act without Virtue but with it; the man who has no share in
ît is to be taught (logically enough) and punished*

Punishment

fits only ethically wrong, not ethically neutral action*

Sim~

ilarly at 325B~C the penalty for not learning the lesson of
Virtue is death; the possibility of being neither virtuous nor
vicious is here excluded from consideration*

Protagoras® bril

liant rhetoric makes no clear distinction between negative and
contraryo

He deals largely in black and white, usually ignor

ing the possibility of gray.
rhetorical flow.

In the Great Speech he is in full

Typical of the Speech, though not in any sense

áietaken 'in 'logic, are"those, parents who .tell their children
•}%lieser things'.pjrja: h p ^ y ^ y those ;i*n|*oly,M and do not stop.
.to con
sider, 'so far as Brotagcras is concerned, that there might be
some actions which aré neither.·'where the category ’holy’ or
’unhôîÿ’'does not apply*
Before analysis of these flights of philosophical oratory,
it is necessary to step aside and look at negative and contrary
in some ethical Contaste other than those of this dialogue of
Plato’s,.The words ’just’ and ’justice· are used In Greek as·
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in English of actions or of men.

If actions are described as

just, it may be, according to the feelings of the describer,

in a set of rules for justice, what

because they fall with

the source of the rules; it may be because the actions concerned
were done in a certain way, with certain accompanying graces,
or as M.F. Burayeat has it, in a certain style;^ it may be
that before the word 1just* is considered fully applicable the
action must result from a certain disposition.

Now if the ac

tion is commended for falling within certain rules, those rules
may be either positive. Instructing the persons regulated to
take certain positive steps; or they may be negative, telling
us to avoid certain types of act.

In the first case there may

h e a class of actions which will be permissible, but of which
it would be wrong to say either that they are just or that they
are unjust - for example (in a normal context) choosing to eat
sausages rather than egg for breakfast.

In the second case

there can not be any such class; anything not actually forbid
den may be said to be a just act, and there is no third cholee;
an action is either forbidden or not forbidden.
t h e choice of sausages would clearly be just.

In this case
If just acts are

those performed in a certain style, similar considerations
apply.

If the style is positively enjoined upon the agent, then

there may bs a class of actions neither just nor unjust; lacking
the necessary style to earn the the title 1just*, but not reprehensibly lacking.
a

On the other hand, if the requisite style is

m a tte r of avoidhg certain reprehensible styles, then there
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again cannot he such a third class -of action«

If the matter fee

one of disposition, again- similar considerations apply; except
that it rosy be that here the third class, where possible, may
be larger than in the first two; for it may include actions
which, though in other circumstances deacrifeabie as just, do
not happen in the particular case to be accompanied by the re
quired disposition.

Such actions or acts are not normally

describabie as unjust, whatever extremist philosophers may have
said.
Applied to individual human -beings the-words behave some*·
what differently,

A man is, for normal language, ’just* if he

normally or for the most part does just actions.

If a man is

unjust he will not normally, when confronted with a choice be
tween just, and unjust acts, choose to act justly, but will,
with varying frequency, choose to act unjustly.
to be. neither just nor unjust:

Suppose a man

he may then be supposed to act

justly in about half of the situations in which he has a choice
between just and unjust, in the other half he acts unjustly*
What he does in choices morally indifferent, or between acts
equally just or equally unjust, has nothing to do with his
being just, or unjust, or not*»just.

One would be hard put to

it to find anyone other than the half~&nd~haIf man who is neither
just nor unjust, unless, it be a hermit, or a Robinson Crusoe
before, the arrival of Friday.

Perhaps even a Robinson Crusoe

might be a just man, even if no evidence were..available to
prove it; but this is a question on which not all philosophers
would agree,
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It is time to return to Plato’s text.

Protagoras’ first

inference of the kind we are investigating teas from the non
possession of the political art (including justice) to the com
mission of unjust acts against each other the moment human
beings came together.

Now men without the virtue (among others)

of justice might still do just actions in one of two ways;
either by chance (divine chance, for Plato) or because they did
not have the full virtue, but nevertheless had an inferior form
of it which helped to stabilise actions in the strait and narrow
path of justice.

Of course, for Plato, in some of his moods,

the two are not altogether as distinct as we should wish; either
can result from right opinion.

Protagoras does not allow ex

plicitly for degrees of justice such that only above a certain
level is the word ’justice* applicable properly; but he does
not deny this either.

If we divest Protagoras* myth of the

gods in whose existence he had himself no firm belief, we are
left surely with a gradual progress towards a just and stable
society, in the course of which the word ’just* will slowly be
come more applicable, until it is as fully applicable as one
can reasonably expect.

It would be hard to suggest that until

this society arrives, no just actions will be done:

but it is

equally indefensible to suggest that no unjust action will be
performed.

Is this an adequate defense of Prbtagoras* apparent

inference that the absence of the political art entails the
presence of sufficient injustice to submit: the whole of society?
Arguably not:

for it does not follow from the absence of po

litical art that that enormous proportion of unjust acts will
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be performed,

Protagoras does not prove that no just acts

would be performed in a society devoid of justice; he doe»
nothing to disprove for example* the suggestion that in such
a society^ moral choice being random, an equal number of just
and of unjust acts would get done, leaving society perhaps
staggering, but still on its feet,

Protagoras is vague about

how much injustice it takes to make society Impossible.

A

society thus staggering might, by what Plato would have called
"divine chance," cohere,

Protagoras' inference from the ab*>
ftS
sence of justice to the cohesion of sufficient unjust acts to
undermine society is not obviously cast-iron.

It is not ob

viously fallacious either, but in view of its dubious-looking
general appearance Socrates could feel, after it that another
inference from contrary to contradictory was worth trying out
on Protagoras^ just as he felt the questions of 329-330 to be
worth asking.

It is not plain from the Great Speech that

Protagoras is clear about contraries and contradictories; and
Socrates could be fishing.
The next example, number (2) above, is even less clear.
If a man is wholly incapable of a just act, then indeed the
sooner the city is rid of him the better.

In any choice be*

tween just and unjust he will choose the unjust, and the re
sults will certainly make him a plague.

If & man is merely

incapable of learning to be more often just than unjust, or of
acquiring a fixed disposition to do just acts, he is always
likely to be a nuisance, but ha will, not necessarily be so
disruptive that the only thing to do with him is to cast him
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out,

If Protagoras is talking obvious sense„ he must be re~

ferring to the man incapable of a just act; but then it is not
clear that to have no share in justice means that all the agent*s
actions will necessarily be either neutral or unjust,

Here too

there is a certain fuzziness about Protagoras* interpretation
of the negative*

It is again not clear whether he is simply

deducing contrary from contradictory or going through a more
careful process of reasoning..
Certainly at (3) Protagoras shows signs of awareness that
Ί .'

there might be a tilias quid, though not any high degree of
Ivssta parallel, between someone not good at

awareness , We have

an art and an unjust man.

This will hold only if an unjust

s,just man « but this we hav

man is the negative of
be dubious.

The passage may indirectly throw light on Protago»

ras® thinking elsewhere.

It may be that Protagoras is thinking

throughout of Virtue as an art orTfc^yij

like flute-playing in

which non-expertness implies actually bad performance if there
*v

m

*

is any performance.

m

τττ*ττιΐΓ" “ami*'^iw»»r·JL'rs&¿asutttsB9

But Socrates could be pardoned for not de-

duclag this, i n the light of difficulties over the question how
far Protagoras is consistent in treating Virtue as a craft.
And what of thfe middling performer, the middling expert?
Number (5 ) i s somewhat similar to (1) and (2), but is
easier to excuse.

The man without any share of Virtue may do

things by chance.

But sooner or later he will do

some deed, worthy of punishment.

It is only in form that this

is an argument from contradictory to contrary.
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But (4)» the last we need discuss, is a little différente
'J
The phrase "in order that he may not again ozbæ-vf,, " must mean
IV*

"in order that he may not again commit an unjust act; even if
the sense did not require this, the state of injustice is vir
tually ruled out by the choice of the Aorist Subjunctive.

But

nevertheless there remains a choice between an act contrary to
rule, an infringement of the correct style, or (to look at the
matter through the eyes of the punisher) a question of forming
a disposition or developing a capacity»

One,, more rudimentary,

problem may here be brushed aside; that is the question how a
man is deterred, by being punished for one particular kind of
unjust act, from committing another sort of unjust act.

Host

of us would doubt the psychology of such & notion of deterrence;
the fivefold classification of Virtue is an Inadequate basis
for penology.

But, leaving that aside, the passage implies

that anyone «ho does not commit an act of injustice, or act
in an unjust way on any particular occasion, is just.

Here

the rules for just actions or the instructions for a just
*style* of action would have to be negative, or prohibitive, in
character.

Otherwise the avoidance of injustice or of unjust

action will not constitute justice, as Protagoras* argument
requires.

If Protagoras* punishers are thinking in terms of

(say) forming a disposition, the disposition concerned must be
one which entirely or virtually entirely avoids certain types
of act.

The acts one Is thus disposed against are unjust acts;

one may be disposed to do only just things or to do only things
either just or neutral, but what constitutes the disposition in

29

this passage is the avoidance of certain types of action, rather
than the commission of certain types®

The avoidance of injus*

tice in this passage is treated as not merely a necessary bat
a sufficient condition of justice,,

This could be formally cor

rect only if justice is & matter of obedience to prohibitions®
At this Protagoras* listeners ought to prick up their ears
and look for signs in the Protagorean society of something more
than mere prohibitions in ethical matters®

He might indeed find

them in the instructions of the parents to the children; but
it is to be hoped that those Instructions were clearer to the
children than they are to the analyst®

The instructions are

”These things are just, those unjust ® ® » do these but do not
do those®”

Supposing all three sets of opposed kinds of act in

this passage are to be taken with the closing imperatives, the
parents do not actually say that certain positive injunctions
must be followed to achieve justice®

They divide the relevant

actions into (at least) two classes, the just and the unjust®
The injunction to do the former need not imply any theory of
the distinction between just and unjust, being compatible either
with the assumption that there is a third set neither just nor
unjust or with the contradictory assumption®

Protagoras does

not therefore make his position clear; and the negative view
of moderation taken at 326A does not help to decide the problem
of justice®

What Protagoras says in this part of the Great

Speech is thus compatible with his having made the mistake of
illegitimately deducing contrary fr o m contradictory,

The mis

take in question would be the inference implied, in the passage
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about punishment, from non-injustice to justice; from the
avoidance of unjust acts to the possession of justice,

Socrates

would be particularly prone to take this inference as an ille
gitimate one since he at least probably regarded justice as
something more than a mere avoidance of injustice.
Another place to find some positive injunctions is in
Protagoras* statements about the laws of the city.

The city,

at 326C ff,, compels its citizens to live according to the laws,
offering the laws as an example, and the process is compared
to one used by teachers of writing.

The teachers trace an out*·

line of the letters for their less advanced pupils to follow.
This comparison indicates a positive statement by the laws of
what is to be done; whether the laws in fact did give such a
positive guide to one’s conduct in ancient Athens is here be
side the point, since our present interest is in Protagoras9
views.

But at 326D Protagoras says that whoever cgoes outside5 these

rules, these lines traced out by the city, is punished by the
city*

Here again the victim of pimishment might complain that

it was possible to go outside what the city positively enjoined
without committing a crime; the city did not dictate in its laws
one* a choice of breakfast.

The city has uo right to punish all

who go outside the laws unless the laws are negative or partly
negative in character, and unless it is the negative part(s) of
the laws which are under consideration.

The point is all the

more relevant in that Protagoras closely associates what is
f u l with what is just, and further declares that the city’s
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laws are the indication of its Interest in the citizens* Virtue»
We are thus uncertain whether Protagoras is clear on the ques»
tien whether the acts which are unlawful and hence unjust are
necessarily endowed with a quality of injustice contrary to,
rather than merely contradictory of, the quality of justice.
Apart from observing the possibility that Protagoras slips
in these last passages over contrary and contradictory, Socrates
could also observe

(a) that Protagoras in his speech proceeds

with a surely unusual frequency from'a statement about àh eth
ical contradictory to one about the relevant contrary; (b) that
it is also far from plain whether Protagoras is in a position
to justify even those inferences of this kind other than the
last one we have discussed.

It need not surprise us in the

face of these observations that Socrates should find it worth
his while to try out on the Sophist an inference from contra
dictory to contrary; to try on him the deduction from the pre
miss that holiness produces non-just actions to the conclusion
that holiness produces unjust actions.

Nor is it shocking that

Socrates should find Protagoras, with the black and white of
his own rhetoric dancing before his mind's eye, unable for the
moment to see the subtle shades of gray that he can on occasion
recognize —

or else unwilling in the face of Socrates * evident

skill to attempt the distinctions necessary to attack Socrates *
inference without demolishing his own.

Certainly interpreters

©£ this argument of Socrates should bear in mind the possibility
that the chief remaining fallacy la it is no mare Socratic than
it is Protagorean.
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When Protagoras agrees formally to the notion of the eth
ically indifferent at 35IB if is only after he has cut his
losses by abandoning some previous positions; .then, in sober
argument, he can detail the three classes, good, bad, indiffer
ent?

But in his Great Speech he gives only intermittent and

feeble signs of having thought the matter out and none of car*
ing about, it,,

In Socrates'3 first joust with him he is still

so under the spell of his own rhetoric that he is unable or un»
willing to make the effort to undo that rhetoric*6 effect?
When Socrates uses a form of inference which is incorrect butt
at least on the surface, hard to distinguish from some of his
own ·arguments, then, it is not easy for the Sophist thus early
in the game to adjust himself to new rules more exacting than
those of rhetoric?

When he has had time to think and is no

longer bound by his own. previous remarks Protagoras is * vary
different philosopher?
But Protagoras and Socrates are to some extent at least —
to how great an extent is of course uncertain «*» puppets in
the hands of Plato?

We shall have to ask ourselves eventually

what Plato stood to gals by so portraying Protagoras appearing
t o make mistakes and Socrates turning the tables on his adver
sary by committing similar errors?
more of Socrates* attacks?

But first let us look at
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III
After the brief tussle with degrees of ÜBdUA'fcy and
identity at 331C-332A has led to the abandonment of this line
of reasoning, Socrates starts on another tick.

The ensuing

argument has struck some as wildly fallacious:

and Protagoras*

answers seem too readily to give the game away.

But re-examin

ation will suggest that some facets of the Protagoras* original
manifests account fairly well for rsany at least of this argu
ment *8 disturbing features.
On the surface the chain of questions beginning at 332A is
simple, and say be summarized as follows:-κ'^οσ-ονη

, or folly,

exists, and has an opposite, namely ¿rod/* or Wisdom?

Yes,

When men act rightly and beneficially,. do they then a%*few£Ív
(act moderately and/or sensibly) or the opposite?
display moderation.

Clearly they

Conversely, those who act not-rightly act

foolishly, and do not behave with moderation?

Yes,

Therefore,

acting foolishly is the opposite of behaving moderately, and
folly the opposite of moderate behavior?

Yes,

So, folly having

a

been declared opposite to both wisdom '(c^'?.4 ) and moderation
(ϋΐύ^οβννη

> must be identical, since one term can have only one

opposite.
Several peculiarities of this argument have drawn adverse
comment.

The first end chief of these is the over «-all equivo

cation on which it rests. ^»c<rvW): has two different senses,
¿Mid m y légitimât sly heve two opposites, one to each sense,
Surely Socrates is here a t his most trivial and Protagorae afc
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hla least percipiente

Shorey was raore trenchant:

"That, of

coarse, is sophistry,"3'^ Socrates, say the critics, is either
forgetful of logic, or concerned only to beat the sophists at
their own game»

Bat neither hypothesis is very convincing.

Plato’s Socrates is not always logical, but the illogicalities
are not usually as transparent as these.

Beating the Sophists

at their own game would be more purposeful in this particular
case if it were not clear that Protagoras is an opponent to be
taken seriously, and that Socrates Is the first in this dia
logue to sin with anything like since blatencyï

Protagoras

has Indeed implicitly contradicted himself, but he has used
no arguaient a tenth as thick-headed as this one appears to be.
In any case Socrates purports to be playing a different game
—

that of dialectic as opposed to speechifying; it remains to

be explained why he should play it to all appearances so poorly.
To explain this we may put another question to the text:
is there any reason why Protagoras cannot take the obvious way
out, and distinguish, two senses of *folly® (c^£o«rw*j )?
can he not say that

Why

, 8folly* means sometimes ’foolish*

ness* or ’lack of good sense* and sometimes ’self**indulgence*?
Let us see what effect such an escape would have on his total
position as previously taken up in this dialogue.

Protagoras

would be required to say that Socrates* argument would be ¡aistaken because there are two sorts of *f©Jly% one Intellectual
and one @oral.

Socrates, he would then say, is equivocating

on these two senses.

If fee were indeed to proceed in this way,

the results would be far-reaching.

We have seen how Protagoras
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in the Great Speech avoids explicitly equating Virtue with the
intellectual quality of wisdom; and how he nevertheless utters
a sentence at 32ID which could be taken to mean (though it is
not the only possible meaning) that Virtue is a
or part of wisdom.

, a kind

We recall also that st 324B Protagoras

uses ’make wise* in parallel with *make better*.

The anti

thesis in that passage is ruined if there is a distinction be*»
tween being made wise at something and being made good at it.
It is now relevant to enlarge on some related problems in the
Speech,
That

, *wisdom*, or *a wisdom9, is in certain con®

texts interchangeable with ’art*,

» is well known,

Prota

goras himself speaks of a particular kind of wisdom as embedded
in art,

at 321D, referring to the same thing as the

’’craftsman* s art" at 322B,

In the relevant kind of context

Protagoras can therefore use either ’art9 or ’wisdom* salva
veritate.

Now he is also made to call Virtue an art, which

might seem to indicate that he would call it also a wisdom; &\nd
in that case he is on dangerous ground in making wisdom a part
of Virtue,

It is true that Socrates neatly presses the notion

of Virtue as an art on Protagoras in a series of adroit quesJO/
tions usefully documented by Gagarin, ' But intellectualist
ethics come quite naturally to Protagoras; he is an intellec
tual, he teaches things of the intellect, and later in the dia
logue he accepts without hesitation or doubt the primacy of
intellect in determining human conduct (352B-D),

It is not for

U6

nothing that the title "sophist" in which· Protagoras takes so
much pride is related to the word for ‘wisdom*,
After accepting from Socrates at 319A the suggestion that
his subject is "the political art,5' Protagoras admits the ex
pression to his own vocabulary at 322B ( t w i c e ) T h e r e it rep
resents the sum of moderation and justice or the quality for
which moderation and justice are different names « Then, how/
ever, at 322C "the arts" (Ίέχν»ί> ) are distinct, and moderation
and justice are added to Man’s equipment after the arte„

Hext,

in the following section, Zeas suggests that there would be no
cities if moderation were confined to a small number of experts
like the other arts, , ^
arts again.

This clearly puts Virtue back among the

The impression that Virtue belongs among the arts

is deepened by Protagoras ' use of
Tv*\r,

.. ,

-ij

, « carpenter63 or other craftsman*8 ’virtue’,

with reference to the same thing as at. 322B with the expression
’craftsman’s art’*

The disfincf.ioa between Virtue and art seems

hers on the point of vanishing*

At 322E the words "political

Virtue" mean the same as the earlier "politic*! art.·" .'Virtues"
again, at 323A, means the same as ‘arts' ., and is replaced by
the word "art" in the singular later in the sentence.

The lo

cution "this virtue" at 323C likewise seems to presuppose a set
of other ‘virtues1, no doubt those referred to at 323B-,

But

at 326S and 327E ’Virtue* is employed by itself as if it were
a sufficient designation for moral or "political" Virtue, with
out specification.

327B, 327Ç ("a craftsman it this matter,"

i.a. in justice) and other less clear passages all tend to
assimilate Virtue to the arts.

The upshot is that Virtue is
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an art throughout the Great Speech except for the single pas
sage in Hermes * address to Zeus*

Protagoras has in large

measure committed himself to the intellectual nature of Virtue,
to its assimilation (epistemologically) to an art.
To say this is not to deny the obvious fact that Protagoras
is deeply concerned to show at least one major difference between the political and the other arts.

He has to show that

though few are expert in the others, the political art is open
to all, and indeed known in some degree by all.

The distine<yAf
tion is fundamental to Protagoras* whole position.^ But that
does not make Virtue any the less an art, something one can
learn and teach, something at which one can be skilled, in
Greek (ToéûSs often rendered 'wise*.
Believing these things the sophist not unnaturally finds
it difficult to distinguish in a moral context between moral
folly and intellectual folly.

If he were to turn round now

and say that in the sphere of moral actions there were two
sorts of folly, one moral and one intellectual, he would have
to specify which was which.

If he were then to say that the

intellectual alone was the opposite of ‘wisdom* then he would
have to explain the moral importance he attaches to ‘wisdom*;
if he supposed the intellectual alone to be opposed to *modera-'
tion* he would be going against a large element in Greek thought
as well as his own previous remarks according high moral import
to ‘moderation*.
There does appear to be another way out for Protagoras
but It seems excluded by the context.

He could, evidently, say
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that moral folly Is merely a species of intellectual, that it
is only a (kind of) folly which is opposed to a (kind of) wis
dom when the word ’folly1 is used as the opposite of ’modera
tion’»

But this is surely ruled out by the manner in which

the conversation leads up to the introduction of the opposition
between ’wisdom’ and ’folly*»

The 'wisdom* which Protagoras

agrees at 332A to oppose to ’folly* is essentially moral in
nature.

He has agreed at 329E-330A that wisdom is a part of

Virtue, and the discussion has from that point on concerned
itself with two parts of Virtue,

Protagoras must know perfectly

well that the 'wisdom’ he is asked to appose to 5folly* is
moral.

In such a context it is most natural also to take

’folly* as moral in tone, since it is moral action which is
under discussion, ο

ΜΜ/νη , folly, had long had associations

i
/
with the absence of^gcr») » Virtue,

Such associations stem

from the prudential nature of much early Greek morality, and
the emphasis it laid on competitive success rather than on whet
A.W.H. Adkins has called the quiet values,/'

The whole contest,

in both the narrow and the wider sense, is enough to encourage
both a Protagoras and a Plato to forget the possible non-moral
interpretation of ’folly’ and ’wisdom* alike.
moment in the dialogue for resurrection of the

This is not the
,

the wisdom, embedded in the crafts, which Protagoras earlier distingulehed from political Virtue.
The general point made s o 'far is that the obvious way out
of Socrates* argument here is not tfet· easy escape for Protagoras
in this dialogue that it has been taken to be.

Simply to call
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Chat argument fallacious, though true, is not to exhaust its
description.

The reasoning is, like part of his previous argu

ment, ad hominem.

This function of the argument is thrown into

by yet another interesting passage of the Gr

sharper relief
Speech,

At 323B Protagoras is contrasting the art of flute

playing with political Virtue,

If anyone falsely boasts of

being « good flautist he is either laughed at or objected to,
called mad, and his condition is labelle^ madness.

But if he

lays false claim to Virtue this is put down to moderation,
rather than madness.

Here moderation, apparently the same

moderation that is at least part of Virtue, stands in direct
contrast with the state of

, madness.

One does not laugh

at moral delinquency, though one may (however unjustly) at
mental derangement

Either may be the object of annoyance.

It is therefore at least partly mental derangement that
Protagoras lias in mind here.

It is not of course explicit

that the contrast is between diametrical opposites, such as
Socrates is talking about at 332Β-333Β»
ters s

But that hardly mat

the moral and intellectual sides of life are merged by

the contrast between madness and moderation in a single cate
gory, and Protagoras could not unscramble them without having
t o think rather carefully about the implications for this
piece of rhetoric.

It is not likely to be fortuitous that

Socrates® argument depends on an association thus exemplified
in Protagoras’ own words.
Another familiar feature of Socrates® line is the apparent
Inference from contradic tory (non-moderation) to contrary

40

(folly) at 332E.

This need not be a mistake; moderation is a

negative matter in all probability at 326A, and further discus
sion of this Is unnecessary.

But it is worth observing the

infinite gentleness with which Socrates leads Protagoras across
the gap.

We shall see how firmly this argument also is embed

ded in its context»

First, Socrate3 asks, do you admit the

existence of folly {^(*4.^ )?
posite?

Is wisdom its diametrical op

Neither of these questions is easy to reject; both

look like common sense, and after opposing madness and
at 326A Protagoras is in no mood to protest these points.
When men act rightly and beneficially, do they then act moderately-cum-sensibly (rw^fov&V ), or in the opposite way?

Hare

Protagoras should perhaps have asked for a rephrasing of the
question.

But he has scarcely had a chance to recover from

Socrates® exploitation of the Great Speech in the argument that
what is not-just is unjust.

So he neglects once more the pos

sibility of a tertium quid, and plunges on:

folly is after all

difficult to associate with right and beneficial action.
rates eases his path.

Soc

After connecting up the verb and noun

*moderation® and *behave-moderstely* Socrates asks the crucial
question.

“Those who act nofc-rightly act foolishly.,

not

sensiJjly-cum-moderately in respect of this particular kind of
action? *’ This is an awkward one,.
tive) are moderate (positive).

Those who act rightly (posi

Now in addition those who act
1

net-rightly (negative) act foolishly

f

with dt-privative,

in origin a negative form), end· in so acting are not moderate
(negative).

Therefore acting foolishly is the opposite of acting

-·■
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moderately.

This is only s good conclusion if either the

legitimacy of reasoning for contradiction to contrary is
recognized or moderation is a merely negative concepte
rates need accept neither form of this dilemmas

Soc»

but Protagoras

has accepted the second and does nothing to show his rejection
of the first.

The crucial word is surely kÿçovfoS

, which though

negative in origin and appearance can also, like a number of
other

«privative words function as an opposite. Socrates
% /
paves the way by using
first in a sentence full of
,

negatives, and only then suggesting its function as an opposite.
The transition is the more readily acceptable since in Greek
there is no obvious opposite for *rightly*, and the phrase
“not rightly® functions like the English *wrongly*» as an op®
posite as well as a mere negative.

(Indeed it is far from,

clear that actions or agents can be not,-right without being
wrong;

does the saying *My country right or wrong* omit a

viable third alternative?)

So the statement that those who

act no brightly act unsens lb ly (or foolishly) is doubly ambiva®
lent as between contrary and contradictory.

It sounds in any

case reasonable to one with an intellectual1st bias, just as

A,

%.

the proposition that acting foolishly (#®phronos etymologically
V

3without sense*) is the opposite of acting moderately (so®phronos,
etynologically “with sound sense*) sounds reasonable to any ear
attuned to Greek » even if the latter does not follow from the
premises leading up to it in the Protagoras . Altfeasagh there
Ί..
'
~
are a number of legitimate excuses for Protagoras here. Even
if he has here committed the error of deducing a true contrary

î

frost a contradictory, he may at all events be forgiven s little
conf
r these considerations adequately defend Socratic
integrity in argument is another question.

Socrates, most prcb~

ably does not suppose either that <rw$£cew*)

is a purely aàss«fcive

concept or that it is reasonable to argue from a contradictory
to a true contrary.

We behold here a spectacle very like that

of skilled legal counsel leading a witness unperceived by the
judge.

The best defense of Socrates* behavior is that he is

again making use of Protagoras* earlier statements and for
arguments.

It is one of the purposes of this paragraph to draw

the distinction between excuses valid for Protagoras and ex
cuses valid for Socrates.
The duel between Socrates and Protagoras over opposites
has one more oddity to be discussed.

When Protagoras agrees

that right action arises when moderation is present, and wrong
action when it is absent (332Â-B), he seems to be giving sway
much of the position he stood originally tc$ defend.

He is

trying to substantiate the view that justice, wisdom, holiness,
courage, and moderation are separate and distinct parts of
virtue} coordinate like the parts of a f a c e .

But one is hard

put to it to find any f u n c t i o n for the other parts of Virtue
If all actions are right or wrong according to the presence,
or absence of moderation in the agent

If moderation is -both

& necessary and a sufficient condition of right (presumably
virtuous) action, one of the following alternatives would appear.;
on the face of it to be true.

Either (a) ruoderation ia simply
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equivalent to Virtue or (b) any other part of Virtue must
necessarily be accompanied by moderation,,

Yet Protagoras

firmly denied both these alternatives at 329C-E - or at least
denied in general that the possession of any single virtue
implied possession of the rest*,

This suggests two questions;

why does Protagoras thus surrender his position7 and why does
Socrates not immediately accept the surrender?

The second

question admits only of conjecture; & plausible one might be
that Socrates (and Plato) wish to wring more contradictions
out of the situation before bringing the debate to an end; and
in particular that Socrates wishes to argue at greater length
and with greater explicitness for the unity of Virtue in know*
ledge,. The first question takes us back to Protagoras* Great
Speech yet again.
/

sion

We recall that Protagoras used the exprès»
2

y

ft ^ijJcXûVvTdL fou

fUf

\

βίν

, ’’they take care of self-control and that the young
do no evil,”

One possible interpretation of that sentence, we

saw, took it to mean that the presence of moderation ensured
the absence of bad act ions °»(the who 1e^oF^ i r tu^ if one adds
that a contrary can in an ethical

deduced from a

contradiction that would make moderation„ Anotheri
Λ took it to
imply that moderation was the inescapable accompaniment of the
possession of any other of the virtues0

Protagoras has already

committed himself to a position somewhat like that which he
takes up in response to Socrates’ probing at 332A-B,

Plato*s

Socrates is merely bringing out Protagoras * stated though? con
fused opinions on the relations of Virtue and the virtues,

If
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Protagoras surrenders his defensive position it is because he
is not clear precisely where, he stands.

To change the metaphor,

he is caught in a web largely of his own weaving.
If we can thus explain both Protagoras* peculiar admissions
and Socrates* dubious arguments from the implications of the
sophist's previous remarks, then we can hardly, without over·
simplification, accuse Socrates of bare fallacy.

We may not

like Socrates* methods of defeating a distinguished opponent
in debate, but Protagoras has, in the last resort, himself to
blame for the predicament in which he finds himself.

He pays

the price for letting his rhetoric run away with him.

IV
The next subject raised is the relationship of moderation
and justice.

Socrates asks If, in Protagoras* opinion, a man

can, while being unjust, be ’moderate* in respect of the act of
injustice he commits or the state of injustice he manifests.
Protagoras disclaims agreement with this ambiguous suggestion
the first time round.

He assents to it eventually, in a

slightly different form, only for the sake of the argument.
One of the difficulties of the ensuing argument is that the
same verb
an injustice.

) can mean either to be unjust or to commit
It is not clear whether Protagoras is being

asked to agree that an unjust act can be a moderate act, or
whether he is only feeing asked to say that a generally unjust
man, with a disposition to do acts descrifeable as unjust, can
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on occasion comit & moderate act.

The second version Protagoras

could accept - indeed he must, for he has said

the virtues

are like the parts of the face, and it is possible t o be deaf
without being blind.

The other verb important here (<τ&φ£ ovttv ) _

Is fortunately not ambiguous to quite the same degree, and means
usually to be moderate, rather than to perform one moderate ac
tion.

Certainly Protagoras and Socrates are intelligible so

far as this word is concerned without relying on the possibil
ity of talking about moderate actions.

It appears then that

if Protagoras has understood Socrates, the latter is asking
whether a man can h e moderate in respect of an unjust act he
commits, and it is this that Protagoras rejects

shameful.

He allows, however, that there are many people who would accept
that thesis, and agrees for the sake of argument to defend it. .
The agreement (in so far as to commit him to anything) commits
him apparently to the view that injustice is a sensible thing
to do, a reasonable set of rules to live by. But Protagoras
c/u
la no ima,oraliat like the Thraeyaia^fa of Rep. I.
Socrates In reply suggests that moderation (p

)

implies being of good sense (literally, ’thinking well1).
Protagoras of course

c a n no more separate the moral

intellectual aspect of moderation now then in the preceding
argument; he has to go along with this, willy-nilly.

From

’having good sense5 Socrates proceeds to ’deliberating well*.
Here we are in an area of ambiguity.

After a flirtation with

the intellectual side of moderation, we may now fee back in the
moral.

If depends on whether the V a i l * 0/ ’deliberate well1
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refers to morally good deliberation or to successful delibera
tion,

Tiie irmtediate acceptance by Protagoras proves little,

since, as we have seen, Protagoras is in no position to argue
the matter out even if he begins to smell the ambiguity.
this step is added the rider

To

thatthe good de

respect of the unjust action which we have been considering
all the time,

Protagoras again does not like this:

perhaps

it suggests that the unjust act can be good, which he does
not wish to admit, even though in the Greek context the view
was not wholly implausible.

Protagoras again signals his

assent for argument’s sake:

"So be it" (frrToA „

5/

asks a question not easy to follow..

Socrates now

He asks whether this good

deliberation in respect of an unjust action takes place when
in the unjust action the agent(a) ’do(es) well*, or when he
does badly.

Hera we are enmeshed in another ambiguity, since,

as is well known, to do well can mean in Greek either to act
well or to fare well.

But I doubt if Socrates relies at all

heavily on that ambiguity here.

Goad deliberation as a con

sequence of good sense seems mora likely to result in acting
Η
Λ~~
well than in receiving a regard - in so far as- the Greeks realty
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were capable of distinguishing the two.

Anyhow, Protagoras

agrees that one does wall in deliberating well in tbs process
of injustice.

Good deliberation, even in the act of injustice»

is successful deliberation with good (not necessarily -morally
good) consequences.

Socrates1 next question is harmless

enough, and Protagoras agrees that there are some good things.
The next'question in this chain is whether those actions are
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good which are beneficial to man.
Where is the argument leading at this point?

It is not

possible to be certain, and it does not perhaps matter very
much.

But at least we can see if there is any plausible con

tinuation which makes Protagoras* contribution less irrelevant
than some think it.

If the unjust act can be good, or a man

can be good in respect of an unjust act, then at once Protagoras*
position is undermined:

the %ot*n of the adjective ’good* in

Greek is of course Virtue, and injustice cannot be a virtue.
But Socrates can hardly have intended to take that line, or
he would not have brought in the then unnecessary notion of
’beneficial*.

One argument he could be laying the foundation

for is that the injustice in question is beneficial to man:
from this ha could proceed either to say that Protagoras purpox*to to teach a virtue whose opposite is beneficial to man,
or that Protagoras in the myth advanced the view that the ad
vent of the virtues including justice was beneficial to mankind,.
Either way the point lies not in the argument itself but in
positions taken up by Protagoras:

the second denies him the

possible escape route that justice need not be beneficial to
its agent or to the community.

If Protagoras is behaving as

though he expected this line of attack, then we should have an
explanation of-why he should be a little anxious. But in Greek
(thoiaK
net
‘
it is difficultyto deny that what is good is beneficial, and
Protagoras can/do/^ more than say that a thing can be good
even without being beneficial to Man.

Injustice therefore can

be ’good* in some sense, as Protagoras has had to admit, without
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its being beneficial to Man - a position he cannot now consis»
tently take up.

To counter this move it is understandable that

Socrates should ask the further question whether Protagoras
means to separate good and beneficial altogether, or is content
with distinguishing good from beneficial to Man.

If the former,

then Protagoras is going to run into problems of ordinary lan«
gu&ge, in which 'good* apparently did (when used of things)
imply 'beneficial*.

If the latter, then Protagoras is going

to be compelled to find some candidate for the post of bene»
fici&ry of injustice other than Man.
floundering at this point.

No wonder Protagoras is

Instead of giving (he has not yet

been asked to) a beneficiary of injustice, he takes refuge in
generalities, saying that there are some things which are
Cy
beneficial to Man and some which are not (an irrelevant):
7
*fr
Some which are neither to men, but are one of the other to
horses » a relevant point:

and then goes on to give eramples

of the generally relative nature of '
’good*-ness » ’good* re*
placing 'beneficial* in the course of the argument.

The di

gression, however, returns speedily to the subject of Man,
with the mention of olive-oil,

w h ic h

is bad for animal hair,

but good for human, and for the human body in general.

Finally

Protagoras cowies up with the point that 'good* is so various
in application that a thing can be 'good* for one part of man,
but not for another.

This last point is likely to be especially

useful to him, since it might, if he thinks fast enough, enable

\

him to find a'.distinction along these lines between justice and
injustice «— > the one being good and therefore beneficial to man
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in one respect, the other in another respect,.

This would save

the Sophist's bacon by enabling him to admit that injustice in
successful deliberation is good for man, without being appar
ently forced to make injustice a virtue or to question whether
justice is at :er all beneficial to mankind.

What Protagoras

is doing is both to play for time and to maneuver for position.
But Socrates understandably does not see why. in a set
match of this hind, his interlocutor should be allowed to do
either of these things, let alone both.
a poor memory —

He accordingly feigns

this from one who has been able to quote with

out difficulty from Protagoras* earlier lengthy harangue - and
brings the discussion up short.

Which side would have carried

the day in the incomplete argument is of course impossible to
say, but Protagoras has by now made some points which are
clearly going to delay the Socratic victory, even if they do
not prevent it.

This line of argument will not therefore pro

vide an immediate coupe de grace, and Socrates escapes by
O^ ^
pleading a breach of his rules by Protagoras.
But this is only a series of guesses, and one can hardly
extract any evidence worth the name from this passage for the
general thesis that Protagoras* difficulties stem from his own
previous admissions as much as from Socrates8 present arguments.
All that is possible in this case is to show plausibly how this
incomplete argument could be interpreted without being Incon
sistent with this general thesis,

la doing so it is interest

ing to find that Protagoras* burst of rhetoric is neither
wholly irrelevant nor wholly to the point, but is rather a
curate's egg of a speech.

Mí

'

-V
n o t yet answered the question, what Flato

But we have

to gain by playing this kind of trick on his characters„

If

the whole were a verbatim historical account of an actual oc
casion we should have no worries; Socrates would then be shown
putting his dialectical techniques to uses admittedly ad hominem
but not dishonestly so*

No-one could blame Socrates for using

premisses ox’ types of inference in which he does not himself
believe if his opponent does apparently believe in them.

To

apportion blame in this way would be to misunderstand the
nature of dialectic.

What is at first sight puzzling is that

a great philosopher near the height of his powers should com
pose & dialogue in which one protagonist’s mistakes or dubie
ties of premiss or argument are shamelessly taken advantage of
by the other.

What did Plato think he was proving in the

arguments we have dealt with in this paper?
If ary thesis is correct, the answer is that Plato need not
have thought was proving any tiling positive here; least of all
need he have supposed that he was proving the unity of the
virtues.

What he should have deemed himself to have proved Is

that for one holding Protagoras* views

the distinctions be

tween the virtues i.t is not possible to say some of the things
that Protagoras has said or to argue in some of the ways in
which the Sophist appears to argue.
point, and if Protagoras were the·?

If this were the whole
person to hold such

views and to speak in such ways we should have to draw one of
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two conclusions; either Plato has set up an Aunt Sally for him
self to kno_k down, a proceeding whose purpose might well for
ever escape our insight:
history —

or we have here a piece of genuine

not indeed verbatim but giving at least the gist of

Protagoras' own historical words, whether written or spoken.
But this is not yet a necessary conclusion, and I aza un
able to bring myself to believe that it is the whole story
even if it should be proved one day to be a partial truth.

The

fact is that Protagoras is (obviously) not the only person to
believe that there are differences between the virtues; and
there is no need to suppose him to be the only person to argue
from contradictory to contrary.
time to time.

Even Socrates does so from

Witness for example Crito 48B-D, where Socrates

first says he is going to consider the question whether his
proposed escape is just or not, and then says that he is going
to consider what he just said, namely whether the escape is
just or unjust.

It is perhaps significant that the tone of

much of Socrates’ remarks in the Grito is rhetorical.

Other

mistakes or dubieties from our portion of the Protagoras ere
eas iiy found elsewhere also; the Greeks habitually moved from
intellectual to moral nuances of the word sophrosyne without
making trouble about it.

In tying Protagoras in knots Plato

is also tying up many ordinary speakers of ordinary Greek.
Miera a modern philosopher would give us the bore bones of the
distinctions necessary, what Plato does is to show us what
calamities befall those who neglect them.

Where the m o d e m

often aires at simply dispelling the confusions to which ordinary
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language is liable, Plato’s purposes may be suspected of greater
complexity.

Plato wishes to prepare the way for the Socratic

paradoxes, perhaps to show that they are less paradoxical than
they appear.

This in the sense that though some popular ways

of thinking treated wisdom as a separate virtue, though other
distinctions between virtues were familiar to popular speech,
there were nevertheless some strands c£ thought among "the many''
which if taken to their logical conclusion were liable to end
in the paradoxes.

This has sometimes been seen as the point

of the concluding argument of the Protagorae, jand if this is
right the two main eth5.cal arguments of the dialogue would on
the present interpretation hang the more closely together.
It is true that another reading of the evidence here
analysed is possible.

Plato may himself have been unclear

about the extent to which the ethical concepts he is dealing
with depend on positive injunctions and how much on mere pro
hibitions.

He «¡ay not have seen that there are distinctions

between the intellectual, and moral spheres which in the last
resort tend to undermine the central Socratic paradoxes.

But

at present it seems more likely that in the composition of the
Protagoras he betrays his understanding of these things.

First,

Socrates' initial questions by way of response to Protagoras'
Great Speech show that Pleto and his principal character have
thought very deeply about Protagoras
implications.

Secondly it is odd, if Plato did net see these

problems, that there are remarks embedded {by whomsoever) in
Protagoras{ Speech which raise?· exactly the questions raised

*Speech and

hΛ

by Socrates8 arguments«
of deliberate design»

The whole composition bears the marks

But whichever view of Plato’s insight

be taken, it is to be hoped that scholars will at least pay
him the compliment of refusing to dismiss the arguments in
the first round between Socrates and Protagoras as merely
and obviously fallacious»
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‘'’'Protagoras 5 doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the
*Protagoras5 of Plato," Journal of Hellenic Studies, 73
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^ meaning of
course ‘unjust* »■- and ’wrongdoers · and "evildoers* ere such
general words as to give the reader no hint that any particular
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in the relationship between wrongdoing and injustice, (Simil
arly, to render
as *good* "with Guthrie at 323C is to
miss'the distinction Protagoras himself draws between "justice''
and "the rest of civic virtue,,") The translators have smoothed
away the rough places of the argument. The Bude "un coupable"
for Tytks
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"There is no need at this point of the dialogue to dis»
tingulsh too sharply between Protagoras* opinions and the
Athenians", Socrates has admitted the Athenians* wisdom (319B)
and Protagoras not only has not denied it but has accepted
their beliefs as reasonable (3220), The basis of Protagoras*
argument at 323A-C is general human reactions. The argument
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wrote; w , I
at 32T$npScotagoras) speaks of
(reé¿<¿
But he nowhere puts
ηνφ ί* in the foreground of his teac
and in his text "The absence of wisdom is conspicuous,
and must be deliberate on Plato’s part," I am unable to agree
with all of this, but it points in some of the right directions
for inquiry,
13
Apart from Grube, Jowetfc-Ostwald, Guthrie and Lamb in
the Loeb all insert "viadora": Crpiset and Bodin in the Bude
have simply "la politique,"
ïa D* Sevan, "Self-Predication in Protagoras 330-331."
fhrone»* Is 9 (1964) pp 130-135«
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Savan op, cit. (previous note) pp. 133ff, attempts to
absolve Socrates of this fallacy also, but does not I think go
far enough. He says rightly that the paradigm of the face and
its parts dominates the argument, and remarks that seeing
makes no sound and hence sight must be inaudible. Further,
hearing is invisible. "The analogy," he proceeds, "requires us
to say, therefore, that justice (understood as
) is
unholy, and that holiness (understood as
) is unjust
« . . * The argument requises us to say not only that justice
is not holy but also that it is unholy, not only that holiness
is not just but also that it is unjust. This consequence is
too monstrous to be acceptable." This would be more convine®
ing if ^itEeirXt were "clear^that 8invisible* is an opposite,
and not a negative word, or that ‘unjust* were a negative word
and not an opposite. But Savan fails to assimilate the two
terms in such a way as to make his very important argument
hang together at this point. It is not immediately clear from
Plato which alternative Socrates has in mind, if indeed he has
either clearly before him. But this topic is due for extended
treatment below.
^Op. cit. (η. 14) p. 133.
17
"Virtues in Action," The Philosophy of Socrates (ed. G.
Vlastos) esp. pp. 215ff.
18What Plato Said, p. 126.
Iû

Op. cit. (n. 3) p.litftutolrtJi,

*20
The word *other5is here omitted by Jowett-Ostwald; a
puzz1ing omis sion.
9Í
'"Gagarin, op. cit. (n, 3) pp, 142®144.
’ Adkins Merit and Responsibility esp. Chaps. I®IV. I
am not in general convxncid 'by the criticisms of H. Lloyd® Jones
in the Justice of Ecus (Berkeley, 1971) in so far as they con®
cerrT"Homeric ancTSrchaic Greek thought.
23
“On this see Adkins Merit and Responsibility esp. p. 286.
*4At 336A Socrates accuses him of neglecting both brevity
and relevance; neither accusation is wholly false.

